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PANEL III: NEW PARTIES IN
ARBITRATION




M:Welcome back. I hope everybody enjoyed their lunch. Our third and
final panel of the day, New Parties in Arbitration, will be moderated byWCL
professorM3. M3 is the director of the Business Law Program here atWCL,
and his teaching and research interests are primarily in contracts and
commercial law, including their international and comparative aspects. He
was chair of the Section on Contracts of the Association of the American
Law Schools 2005–2006 and chair of the Washington Steering Committee
for the 18th International Congress of Comparative Law in 2010. He is an
elected member of the American Law Institute and a titular member of the
International Academy on Comparative Law. He has served on the board of
directors of the Washington Foreign Law Society, on the board of editors for
the American Journal of Comparative Law. Unfortunately, we do not allow
video or audio recording, third-party video or audio recording. I will give it
away toM3.
M3: Thanks very much for the kind introduction and thanks for all of you
for being here. I am pleased that we have such a distinguished panel to talk
about new parties and arbitration in what, I dare say, is the capstone and
highlight of what I am sure has been an excellent day. So, we have three
panelists, I will keep the introductions brief. P1 graduated from WCL in
2017, so those of you who are current students, look up here. In two or three
years, that is what you turn into. He does international arbitration at
[Redacted]. I have a particular soft spot for [Redacted], my old law firm.
He also does international trade work.
P2 is the managing director at [Redacted], that is a third-party funder in
arbitration. Really, the debate among the panelists early was whether
[Redacted] is big or huge, so that will give you an idea. He is at the forefront
of life on the ground and third-party funding. He practiced international
arbitration at [Redacted] and was the chief investment treaty negotiator for
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Colombia. In addition, he teaches international arbitration as an adjunct
professor at [Redacted]. In addition to those two fine gentlemen, we have
P3 — a tenured associate professor1 at [Redacted]. She literally wrote the
book on third-party funding and international arbitration. In addition, [she]
has over a decade of experience in international arbitration.
So, P3 will go first. After each of the presentations, we will have some
interaction from the panel, and we will proceed that way. At the end, we will
have time for questions from all of you. P3.
P3: Thank you so much, M3. I am so excited to be here. Thank you so
much to the American University Business Law Review for inviting me to
speak with you today. I am going to start us off talking about a particular
new party in arbitration that has been something I have been studying for a
decade at this point, which is third-party funding. Third-party funding was
introduced in one of the earlier panels. So, one of our previous panelists
gave you a quick, brief definition of what third-party funding is. I will go a
little bit further into that in my remarks.
Basically, what I would like to focus on, in the brief time that I have, are
three controversial issues in third-party funding and three less controversial
issues in third-party funding that still have not been fully addressed. So,
starting with the three controversial issues: I would say one of them, the first
one, of course, is the definition. While one of my fellow panelists in the
earlier panel gave a simple definition of third-party funding, I am talking
about three challenges in third-party funding. The first is definitional. So,
whereas on the earlier panel we received a very excellent short definition of
third-party funding, in reality, the third-party funding has morphed and
changed over the past several years. There are actually many different types
. . . . [This] is making it much more challenging to figure out what it is we
are regulating or what it is we are studying. So, [a] traditional third-party
fund[er] is thought of as an outsider to the disputes, so a non-party and also
not a lawyer — so we are not talking about contingency fee arrangements
here — a non-party to the dispute offering one of the parties funds, and
traditionally it is in exchange for some portion of the proceeds that the party
might receive if they win the case. That is the traditional garden-variety
classic third-party funding, if you will.
Now, we have got other types that are questionable as to whether they
even are third-party funding. So, we have corporate finance where we have
funders that are offering money to companies to finance their operating
expenses while they go through arbitration. We also have equity investment
by third-party funders where they take an equity stake or an ownership
1. Since Promoted.
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position within a party or ownership over some of the party’s assets. For
example, in patent cases, there are sometimes some rights to the intellectual
property [or shares in the company] that are traded in exchange for the third-
party funding, that sort of thing. We also have philanthropy. We also [have]
non-profit funders, so funders that exist with another primary motivation
besides profit. Those funders are actually investing in arbitration for
ideological reasons — they want a certain result, or they want to support a
certain policy goal. These are all things that go into this definitional
problem. So, we can talk about that further as we continue our discussion. I
just wanted to put that out there as one controversial issue.
A second controversial issue is awarding the cost of funding to the
winning party. Something that is very common, generally, in arbitration is
that — not all arbitration, but in some arbitration, particularly if it involves
a UK party or UK arbitrators, or any other jurisdiction that follows the “loser
pays” rule — if you win the arbitration, then you get awarded cost. So, the
losing side has to pay the cost[s] of the winner. That is very common, and
the cost[s] include things like attorney’s fees, evidentiary costs, and other
things that you would expect to be included in cost[s].
So, a question that has come up is whether the cost of funding, meaning if
a party has to obtain third-party funding, of course the third-party funder is
typically — most third-party funders are in it for profit. So, there is a cost,
meaning the party has to pay a little more than purely reimbursing the funder
for having paid the attorney’s fees and evidentiary costs. The question is, is
that cost something that is recoverable if the party wins? There has been at
least one case, court case, in the United Kingdom — Essar v. Norscot.2 In
that case, the UK court— this is a domestic court case, so not an international
arbitration — ruled that the cost was recoverable because, this is a narrowing
of that rule, the court found that the losing party had created a situation that
required the winning party to seek third-party funding in order to vindicate
its rights. Meaning, the losing party had made the winning party
impecunious, and, therefore, they had to get third-party funding. That is why
the court said that the cost was recoverable. That has been a controversial
decision: some say that it has far-reaching implications, others say that it is
limited to its own facts. So, that is something that is controversial. It has
not yet fully been addressed in third-party funding guidance or rules.
The last thing that I will mention, which was also discussed a little bit in
one of the earlier panels, is investment arbitration. So, third-party funders
do investment arbitration. The challenge is that investment arbitration, for
those of you who do not know about how it is structured, in most situations,
2. Essar Oilfield Serv. Ltd. v. Norscot Rig Mgmt. PVT Ltd. [2016] EWHC-2361
(appeal taken from Eng. and Wales).
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it is very one-sided in the sense that the investment treaties provide for rights
for the investors and obligations for the states, which means, the investors
— these are the corporations, sometimes individuals, but usually
corporations — the claimants and the states are generally always the
respondents. If the funders are trying to make money, they are going to
invest in the claimants but may not necessarily invest in respondents. So,
some states, many states, are outraged at this, and they do not want third-
party funding involved in investment arbitration. So, there are some
questions about whether or not third-party should either be treated
differently, or some have argued it should not even be allowed. That is one
of the debates that is out there. So, those are the three controversial issues.
I want to quickly mention three less controversial issues that nevertheless
have not yet been addressed. There is a question mark there about how these
issues will actually be addressed in future rules and guidelines, but, for now,
they have not yet been addressed. One is privileges. As you know,
evidentiary privileges are ways in which a party can block having to put
information or give information to the opposing side. So, there is a question
about whether or not information shared with a third-party funder can
maintain a privilege. If you have an attorney-client privilege, or some other
privilege over documents or information, if you share that with a third-party
funder, that is technically not your attorney or not part of your attorney, have
you waived your privilege? Most would agree. Most jurisdictions would
agree, at least in principal, that the answer would be, “No, that is not an
implicit or even an explicit waiver.” Yet, we do not have rules in the books
to protect parties that are sharing information with third-party funders. Here,
in the United States, we only have, as far as I know, three jurisdictions that
have a statutory privilege, which would be Indiana, Nebraska, and Vermont.3
Other than that, you’re basically relying on case law. So, this is an issue that
is not really controversial and yet has not yet been addressed, so I think more
jurisdictions, not just in the United States, but worldwide, need to address it.
The second issue that is relatively uncontroversial is what I call a funder
code of conduct or ethics. So, we have a few jurisdictions in the world in
which funders have, themselves, come up with their own codes of conduct
and codes of ethics. In the United Kingdom, we have the Association of
Litigation Funders that has their own code of ethics.4 “Code of Conduct” is
what they call it. We also, in the United States, have an American Legal
3. Ind. Code Ann. § 24-12-8-1; Neb. Rev. St. § 25-3301; Vt. Stat. tit. 8, § 2255.
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Finance Association5 — they have a code of conduct. But, for the most part,
those are not mandatory associations; those are voluntary, and they aren’t
widespread across the entire world. So, there is a question of, “How do we
govern funder conduct and funder ethics?” I mean, in the attorney field you
have to abide by the rules of professional conduct or whatever rules apply in
your particular jurisdictions in which you are licensed. So, I think this is
something that everybody agrees: funders should have ethics; they should
have a code of conduct, or at least some sort of governing principles for their
behavior. Yet, we do not have widespread adoption of written codes. That
is something I think we should look at.
Tribunals have the power to order a party to disclose the existence of third-
party funding and the name of the third-party funder. We do not really have
any particular rules, as far as I am aware, in any particular arbitration
institution yet that say that tribunals have to ask this question or that parties
have to disclose. We do have guidelines; we have the IBA Guidelines on
arbitration conflicts of interest.6 That does say that arbitrators should ask,
but, again, those are guidelines, those aren’t rules. But everyone agrees that
tribunals have this power to ask the question. There is this gap between
practice, which when tribunals feel they need to they do ask, and the
guidelines and rules that do not necessarily make it explicit — that this is
something that they have the power to do. That is something that is relatively
uncontroversial, but still has not yet been addressed.
So, those are three controversial issues that are still being debated and
three uncontroversial issues that I think need to be addressed formally. I
look forward to the discussion. Thank you very much for listening.
M3: Thanks very much, P3. So, now there is a chance for the other
panelists to give any comments or questions. Thoughts?
P1: Thanks, that was great, a wonderful overview. I have a couple of
quick questions, particularly on your last point about the code of conduct for
third-party funders. Namely, do you have a perspective on [who] should
draft that document, who should administer it, and what type of institutions
should administer it? If there are any particular substantive issues that you
think should be tackled, primarily focused on such a code of conduct.
P3: Thank you very much, P1. That was a great question. So, who should
administer it is a complex question. There are a few jurisdictions, off the top
of my head, I am thinking of Singapore and Hong Kong, that by statute allow
5. The ALFA Code of Conduct, AMERICAN LEGAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION,
https://americanlegalfin.com/alfa-code-of-conduct/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2019).
6. IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, INT’L BAR
ASS’N (2014), https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=E2FE
5E72-EB14-4BBA-B10D-D33DAFEE8918] (on file with speaker).
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third-party funding in international arbitration. As part of their statutes, they
require a code of conduct to be developed. Yet, those two jurisdictions have
not yet developed that code of conduct. So, there is a code of conduct coming
from the government of Singapore7 and the government of Hong Kong.8 We
do not have it yet. So, that is one answer. You also have in the UK, I
mentioned this, the Association of Litigation Funders. The government of
the UK has said, “We are going to let you self-regulate third-party funders.
So, as long as you can self-regulate successfully, we won’t interfere. We
will let you do it yourself.”9 So far, that is what has been happening there.
Then there are funders that actually have their own internal codes, they came
up with a code, [and] that is their internal company policy. I know Bentham
IMF has put theirs [sic] [code] out on their website. There are other funders
that have them whether they may or not be public. So, I think right now it is
sort of a hodgepodge of different possible regulators including self-
regulation. I do not really have an ideal sense of who should regulate, but I
do think that the biggest concern in my view is consumer protection, making
sure that whoever is hiring the funder is sure that they are getting a funder
that is reputable, that is well-capitalized, that is going to be supportive of
their lawsuit, not interfere too drastically, or interfere at all, in their attorney-
client relationship. I think those are important; and then legitimacy of the
system. So, those are things that I think the funder code of conduct should
address. Thanks.
M3: P2, do you want to make a comment, or do you just want to head
straight into your presentation? I will leave it to you.
P2: I will do a little bit of both.
M3: Okay, great.
P2: Just a comment, because P3 referenced to one of the more
controversial points is a good segue into why we are discussing third-party
funding here. Why is it now so controversial mainly in investor-state
arbitration? As you explained, part of the reason is that a state is there, there
is the perception that because of third-party funders, there are more cases or
there will be cases in investor-state arbitrations. Some of them may be
frivolous. I will leave it there because I want to sort of demystify that idea
that because there is third-party funding in the world, there should be more
cases. Quite to the contrary, in many respects.
Now, before explaining one of my points in the presentation, which is the
7. CIVIL LAWACT OF 2017 [CIVIL LAWACT] § 5B (Singapore).
8. Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) (Amendment)
Ordinance, No. 6, (2017) A143 O.H.K., § 98P.
9. See generally Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, 2018, Ass’n of Litig.
Funders.
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procedure that we go through to determine whether we would fund a case or
not, I would like to say that it is entirely true in investment-treaty arbitration
[that] the most likely party that would be funded are claimants. Mainly
because the treaties do not provide obligations for investors, and therefore
the most a state can do in a case is not lose or get an award for cost in its
favor. It cannot be given any damages awards if it is strictly an investment-
treaty arbitration. If we are referring, however, to a commercial contract
arbitration, and a state or a state-owned entity is involved, there is nothing
preventing the state or the state-owned entity from being the claimant. That
in itself puts you in a position where the state or the state-owned company
can be funded. In fact, we are actually funding a state-owned company in
the enforcement of an award currently. So, there is a concrete example.
Also, states have been funding [sic] by non-for-profit funders, and that is a
case that you may have already heard of. It is Philip Morris v. Uruguay
case,10 but that was for a non-profit. So, all-in-all, it is true that [in] investor-
treaty arbitration, most of the companies are being funded, not the state. If
you put into the equation a contract, either investment-related or not, the
possibility for the state-owned company or the state is there for getting
funding. With that, let’s talk about the process.
I won’t go into the definition, I think that P3 has done a marvelous job in
terms of providing the more specific and wider definitions. I personally
subscribe to the wider definition. I would only say that a third-party funder
could be the lawyers if there is, in fact, a contingency fee. Who is funding
the case [are] the lawyers in many respects because they’re reducing their
fees for a profit. The damages award is favorable. It could be the bank, or
it could be your aunt. The thing here is, in many of those cases, nobody asks,
“Why?” and, “Where is the third-party funding?” I think that third-party
funding has become sort of the public eye with investors at arbitration and
with questions on ethics.
Let’s tackle three questions here. First, I will go beyond the definition, I
do not want to define anything. I just want to say what happens — and I
want this to be clear — if the case is lost, the claimant loses, then the third-
party funder loses everything, the whole investment. If the claim is $5
million in lawyer’s fees, the funder loses $5 million. But does the lawyer
lose [it] or the claimant? They lose their case, of course, but they are not
losing the investment — that is a clear element here. What happens if they
win? If they win, then the funder gets, because of his investment, a
percentage of the damages award or a multiple of the investment. It is for-
profit or at least the institutional fund[ers] that I am referring to.
10. Philip Morris v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, 56 ILM 1 (2017).
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These are the issues, and I will not address all of them, but the presentation
will be there for your reading later. As far as national requirements, what is
the due diligence process? Who controls [it]? Which is the key question in
this whole discussion. Let’s look at this slide here. That is the whole
financial process. The one that you cannot see, and I apologize for that, says,
“due diligence process.” This is what we go through. We are first
approached by either a client or counsel; eighty percent of our portfolio
includes cases that have been originated by counsel. So, counsel really
becomes our target if we are speaking in terms of marketing processes. After
being approached, we run a conflict check, just like a law firm would do, to
make sure that we have no conflict with the parties, to make sure that we
have no conflict with the counsel, to ask ourselves whether the experts that
we may be consulting later on have any conflict [with] either party, et cetera.
We run a conflict check, as any firm would do. Then, we enter into a non-
disclosure agreement, basically, for everyone’s protection — we will protect
your information, you will protect our financial information, and the model
that we work on. Then we go into the slide that you cannot see, and I
apologize for that. The due diligence process — that is the most important
part [of what] we do. After doing the due diligence process, we enter into a
term sheet or offer terms — commercial terms, and that is a provisional offer.
While we do that, we [go] outside of the third-party funding company, and
we ask for a second opinion both on damages and on the substance of the
case. If everything goes well, we then enter into a funding agreement. Then,
the case begins being funded. While the funding happens, we receive reports
from counsel as to what is going on in the case.
So, that brings me to one of the issues that P3 raised about ethics [and] the
code of conduct. One of our key elements, at least in many of the companies
[where] I work, is [that] we are funders, and we are not counsel. We do not
control the case. We do a very, some may think, annoying due diligence
process, very in-depth, but once we launch the case, once we launch the
funds, we step back, and counsel is counsel. We do not interfere with
counsel’s decisions. That, in part, is because we belong to the one of the
associations that P3 mentioned, which is the Association of Funders in the
UK. Under their code of conduct, the lines between counsel and funders
[are] very well determined.11 In addition to that, in our business we are all
licensed attorneys, and we understand very well that if we mess with the
obligations that counsel has with its party, we may be disbarred. I love being
licensed.
So, let’s take one step and let me answer one of the main criticisms. Do
11. See generally Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, 2017, Ass’n of Litig.
Funders, ¶ 2.
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we fund frivolous claims? You’ll answer that question after I explain the
process that we go through. So, what do we ask for? We ask for there to be
a one-to-ten ratio between the cost of the arbitration, from point zero to the
payment of the award; that is the cost of the whole arbitration, ten being the
damages award. If that ratio is met, it becomes an interesting case
financially. If that cost is not met, we simply say, “We are sorry that you
have been mistreated, but we cannot have a funding conversation.” It is
refreshing because we are not abusing anybody’s time, we are simply saying
we would, or we would not be interested in it financially. If that is met, then
we move forward, we look into the budget of the arbitration. Who provides
a budget? The lawyers. We look into whether it could be enforced. There
are jurisdictions, for instance, investment arbitration, where you know that it
is more difficult to enforce an award. In Latin America, you may have some
thoughts; in other countries, you may have some thoughts. If it is not
enforceable, we may not go in. If it is enforceable, but it is difficult to
enforce, that gets into our model. It may be difficult, so it may take not one
year, but three years, so that needs to be taken into the financial model, so
that at the end of the day we can think, “What kind of proposal will we make
to the party and to counsel?” We look into the merits and into jurisdiction.
All these elements are analyzed by people who have done ten or fifteen years
of their legal career into international investment arbitration or international
commercial arbitration. If that goes well, then we offer terms. The terms
normally go as follows; these are examples. This is not the offer that we
always [sic], but these are examples. In year two, we would expect about
twenty-five percent of the damages award or two and a half times the
investment. That increases every two years: thirty percent, thirty-five
percent, up to forty percent. With the objective that the funded part[y] never
gets less than fifty percent of the damages award that they receive. If it is
earlier in time, then you will get more.
With that, I think that I have answered the question of whether we fund
frivolous claims. There is no reason why we would do that because
ultimately if we did it, we would be just wasting money, so, rationally, there
is no way that we would do that. Is there a risk? Yes, there is a risk, but the
idea is that through, what we call, the gold standard of the review, we get to
a point where we can say to the party, “Your case is good,” or, “Your case
has these flaws.”
Just to finalize that is the process, and we will be discussing a few issues
that you may also be interested in learning about. Such as, disclosure and
what should be disclosed off the third-party fund. Thank you.
M3: Thanks very much. So, maybe some reactions from the other
panelists?
P3: Thank you so much, P2. I have a question about, after you do your
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due diligence or at least you’ve started to look at the legal merits of a case;
if you decide you’re not going to fund it, how do you break that news to the
party? Do you give them any information about how you came to that
decision or do you just say, “We are not going to fund you. The end?”
P2: That is a great question. Yesterday I had a conversation with one of
the counsels that we have received leads from. I knew that there might be a
little bit of a thorny relationship because we rejected one of their cases. To
my good surprise, it was completely the opposite. They were thankful
because we take the time, or we try to break the news quickly enough, so that
they won’t lose time, and we try to walk with them through the reasons that
they do not allow us to fund the case. If it is a financial reason, the
conversation is very quick. I mean, I didn’t use to like discussing money
issues before, and I thought, “Well, am I going to be able to do this?” It is
very quick because you say, “Listen, there is nothing that we can do.” An
ICSID case costs, at the very least, I would say at the low end — this is being
very optimistic — $3.5 million, around $3 million; and that is really working
with a very slim budget. It could go up to $6 million, et cetera. If you do
not have the multiple $60 million for a $6 million in cost claim, then there is
no conversation there. But if there is, for instance, a good damages
perspective, but you have severe flaws in jurisdiction or severe flaws on the
merits, then you have to analyze that and tell that to counsel. In this
particular case that I am referring to, counsel basically came back to me, after
we had to know, and she asked me whether — she knew that we were not
going to fund it. But then the question became whether she should encourage
the client to self-fund it. She came back to me to say, “I do not see the right
in the concession. I am having second thoughts about this. What do you
think?” Yesterday she came back with another case. So, the idea is to
become part of the conversation in legal terms.
M3: I am going to just interject something for P3 and P2. You do not
have to respond now because I think we will have [sic] after the conclusion.
But when we were talking about setting up the panel, I thought maybe there
would be some interesting areas of disagreement. It is interesting to hear
you all talk about this. Just from the scholarly and judicious perspective,
following my usual subtlety, let me just say, I think this whole situation is
outrageous! When you said that there were these controversial issues about
definitions and codes of ethics, to me the controversy is that it exists! We
seem to have skipped over that.
We might ask ourselves, why did it get skipped over? The potential
answer is that there is an enormous conflict of interest — the people working
on this are the lawyers who make money out of international commercial
arbitration. Then you say, “Oh, no, we have these prestigious jurisdictions
— the UK, Singapore, all of whom are doing everything they can to promote
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their arbitral markets.” I mean, Singapore’s whole business model. So, if
we move away from the perspective of counsel, arbitrators, the bar
associations, and the people who will write the codes of ethics and think
about the question from the symposium: is this a friend or a foe of
corporations? It seems to me what underlies [sic] — and now being a little
more serious. The question people keep on talking about, “All right, well, it
is the claimant, not respondent.” Is this a friend or a foe? A lot of depends
on, are you going to be the claimant or respondent?
I am interested to hear how the process works, but it is hard to avoid the
idea that the number of arbitrations will be greater than the number of
arbitrations than there were without the availability of extra money. I do not
know that there is any way, theoretically, logically, or empirically, to refute
that unless you say, “Oh, this was going to get brought and was going to get
self-funded, and we dissuaded them when there was a hint of that.” But that
would have to be fairly large number of cases. So, I will put that out there,
and then hand the microphone over to P1 to talk about some other issues.
Then, I think, maybe we will have more stuff to talk about.
P1: Thanks, M3, and thanks to the BLR for organizing this event and
having all of us here. I look forward, very much, to the discussion
afterwards, given M3’s points there. I will also like to add, just before
moving into my presentation, that the ICSID rules committee has proposed
some amendments to the rules. I do not know if either of you have had an
opportunity to review amendments to Rule 21 suggesting a definition for a
third-party funding.12 Then, two obligations on parties that do engage in or
have a third-party funder to both disclose the fact of third-party funding and
the identity of the third-party funder. I think that goes to some of the
disclosure issues that you didn’t get an opportunity to discuss, and then also
some of the definitional issues that you discussed briefly. If you could both,
maybe, talk about that more, I would love to hear your thoughts on the
proposed rule.
The objective in including me in this panel is to round out the discussion
of third parties involved in investment arbitration or in arbitration. I am not
going to speak about third-party funding, but rather a third party being a state
involved in arbitration.
Before diving into my discussion, I think it might be helpful to set up an
example. If you imagine that there is state A and state B that have a bilateral
investment treaty between them; and there is investor A and investor B,
investor A being a national with a qualifying investment from state A, and
investor B being the same of state B. The instance that I am talking about is
12. ICSIDRules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (ICSIDArbitration Rules)
(Aug. 2018) (proposed amendment to rule 21).
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where an investor, say investor A, decides to submit claims against state B.
State A then becomes involved in the arbitration in some form. Usually, they
are requested to partake in the interpretation of certain terms of the treaty or
in some form of consultation with the state to see if there is a way to seek
mutually agreeable solution to the dispute and find a settlement opportunity.
The questions that I have contemplated in making this presentation are,
“Why would my state want to become involved in a dispute between an
investor and another state? When may a state participation [sic] under the
law? What implication does a second state’s involvement in investment
arbitration have for the investor-state dispute settlement system?” How this
ties in with our discussion is primarily a question of conflicts of interest, but
I do not think we really addressed it fully. Hopefully, it will get addressed
in the questions and answers portion of the panel.
So, my first point, why states might want to participate in an investor-state
dispute settlement? I think, in part, the answer is obvious — self-
preservation is a big interest. When two states have a treaty with each other,
and an investor of one state sues the other state, the two parties to that dispute
are that investor and the opposing or contrary state. So, to take our example,
investor A sues state B. State B is a party to that dispute and is able to submit
its interpretation of the relevant treaty, but state A is left out in the cold where
the interpretation of that treaty might eventually be used against state A. Of
course, it is a member of that treaty or that investment instrument.
One of the perpetuating — not issues in investment arbitration, but
something that makes this issue more prevalent — is we have this notion that
there is no stare decisis in investment arbitration. So, there is no binding
precedent, each case is sui generis, or is taken on its own merits, but that is
not exactly true in practice. Tribunals regularly rely on other cases, and if
you review a brief of investment arbitration submissions, it is rife with
references to other interpretations of similar provisions. That is part of how
the system functions; it is supposed to be a reliable and predictable system
for investors. In fact, Carey Bourne and Gabrielle Carencro (ph), two very
prominent arbitrators have suggested that this is the way of the future, that
relying on precedent is how we build a predictable system. The problem is
that that leaves the interpretation of the applicable treaty to the tribunal and
the other state. So, again, taking the example: Investor A suing state B in
[what is] a closed universe, where investor A gets to submit its interpretation
of the treaty to the tribunal. The tribunal gets to interpret that. Potentially,
state A doesn’t get any part of that interpretation; it doesn’t get to submit its
own interpretation, despite having been party to the treaty negotiation and
having built the treaty along with the other state party. As we see more
multilateral agreements formed, this issue is compounded. If we take, again,
the example and look at now state A, and let’s suggest that state A joins the
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CPTPP— the TPP that went forward without the United States. If now, let’s
say, Japanese investors choose Australia, then state A — not to mention the
other ten parties to that treaty — also has an interest in how the terms of that
treaty are interpreted and applied, so the case had issue. So, this issue, then,
is mediatizing, essentially, as these multilateral treaties are entered into more
prevalently. There are some pretty clear manifestations of states’ frustration
with this approach. If you look at the more recently negotiated investment
chapters of treaties, states have tried to define the protections that are
afforded to investors more carefully —dropping any number of footnotes,
for example, if you look at CPTPP trying to define what fair and equitable
treatment is or what full protection and security is.
So, the states are taking into their own hands this interpretation. If you
look at the USMCA, a similar example is provided where the state parties,
the treaty, have tried to narrow the investment chapter by narrowing both the
substantive investments that are protected by that chapter and the substantive
protections afforded by that chapter. I know that WCL has a pretty big trade
interest, so I think there is an interesting parallel in the WTO world where
the United States has voiced its real frustration with the appellate body taking
the same approach. Essentially taking former interpretations of these
agreements, as opposed to taking the tech [sic] steps sui generis. Now the
United States has refused to permit the election of an appellate bodymember,
essentially frustrating that branch of the system.
So, it is clear that states have an interest in being party to these disputes in
a way that lets them interpret the treaties that may be used against them at a
later date. Time is going quickly. The second interest that a state might have
in becoming involved in a dispute is the protection of an investor.
Obviously, again, if an investor of state A sues state B, and the investor’s
claim is somewhat tenuous, state A might have an interest in interpreting the
treaty and submitting its interpretation of the treaty to the tribunal in a way
that is expansive but provides grounds for investor A to have a claim against
state B. I will discuss some of the substantive and procedural interpretations
that might be an issue that a state might take up in the second portion of this
discussion.
So, secondly, when may states participate under the law? Without getting
into too much detail, both the UNCITRAL rules and ICSID rules, as two of
the most popular rules applicable to investment arbitration, provide for non-
disputing party submissions to be submitted to the tribunal. But both sets of
rules set up the tribunal as the gatekeeper of submissions, so the arbitrarial
[sic] tribunal is endowed with significant discretion to decide whether it is
going to accept these submissions or not. Treaty texts also sometimes
provide avenues for interpretations of the treaty. In particular, I think an
interesting example is [that] the NAFTA and the USMCA set up an
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interpretive body that in 2001 rendered an interpretation of the NAFTA,
while there were investments arbitrations ongoing under the NAFTA. This
caused significant uproar. You can imagine an investor who has submitted
a claim against the state, then, while that investment arbitration is going on,
the state parties, including the state party that is the respondent in that
investment arbitration, submits an interpretation of the treaty narrowing the
scope of the protections provided to the claimants, investors, and potential
claimants under that treaty. So, there is an inherent conflict of interest in that
type of interpretation and that type of procedure.
There is another important type of provision that is included in a lot of
treaties and has been ruled on recently in a number of cases, which is the
denial of benefits. This type of provision, I think, is particularly interesting
in this framework of the second state involvement in investor-state dispute
settlements because of all of the procedural hurdles that can come up in the
denial of benefits. If you think about this in practical terms, one state party’s
interpretation of all of the procedural hurdles involved in the denial of
benefits could effectively either deny or provide access to the denial of
benefits to another state. This is a huge, huge benefit or disadvantage, too,
depending on how the state decides to interpret that provision. If you look
at, again, [the] USMCA or the CPTPP, both of those treaties contained denial
of benefits clauses that would be interpreted by one party; if another state is
prevented to participate in the arbitration, up to eleven other parties.
So, to conclude: what implications does second state’s participation have
on the system? It has implications for the value of precedent — states being
permitted to weigh in and particularize the meaning of texts may decrease
the value of precedent. You can imagine that the state’s interpretation of a
particular term in a treaty would be valued greater than an alternative
tribunal’s interpretation of protections in a treaty. The alternative approach
is to go further down this hole, or approach of stare decisis being essentially
the practical approach to investment arbitration. It could frustrate states
further, making them reluctant to continue with or sign up for more
investment arbitration protection regimes. So, of course, there is a balance
to be struck between the certainty for the investor and the certainty for the
state. When the question is, “Who gets to interpret the treaty? Is it just the
investor and just the opposing state? Is it the states that are also the party to
the treaty and have a vested interest in the outcome and interpretation of the
treaty at issue?”
Finally, just to conclude, so we can get back to our discussion on conflicts
of interest, I think it is fairly clear from the first portion of this discussion
that there are inherent conflicts of interest in a state’s involvement in an
investment arbitration. States have held out a consent to arbitration in a
dispute settlement mechanism, and it is up to the investor to accept that
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consent to arbitrate and go to the arbitration with that investor on the basis
of the treaty. When the adverse states, or the state of the investor at issue,
are then able to interpret the treaty, it has these other interests that are
inherent in that issue. It can either benefit itself by narrowing the protections
afforded by the treaty, so that later claims brought under that treaty have to
be narrowed by the precedent that is caused by that disputed issue. It could
potentially benefit the investor by broadening the definitions of the
protections afforded under the treaty to let the investor have an effective
claim against the state.
M3: Great. Thank you. So, I think it is now open to the panel for a bit of
discussion. In that time, maybe the audience can be thinking about your
questions. We have a few minutes left, we’ve managed our time reasonably
well for plenty of interaction between the panelists and with you in the
audience. Is there somebody that has a mic or something? Do people come
up? Just shout. So, we will start with the panel because I may have floated
a little question here or there in between.
P2: P1, thank you. I have some comments and reactions. Somemay allow
us to go back into third-party funding. I have a bit of a reaction to the idea
of the investment treaty arbitration or investment arbitration system being
informally ruled by the idea of stare decisis. I think that I understand what
you meant, but I take a little bit of a different approach. I think that,
technically, it is not stare decisis, but at the same time it is completely that,
if you read any brief either from responder or claimant, you will see a
plethora of decisions being cited. What I see in the system is both counsel
for claimant and respondent looking and exploring into the lines of case
jurisprudence that there are. Basically, taking into account those decisions
to support their cases. That is what I see really happening. That being said,
I think that the system, the investor-state arbitration system — we haven’t
discussed this, but I will put it out there — is one that has been unfairly
treated because there is this perception that everything is inconsistent. But
there is no consistency at all, and you can basically argue whatever you want
in an investment treaty case, which I think is not true. The system has really
about thirty years of real existence or forty years, fifty years, of real
existence. The system has, indeed, decided a few topics, which I would call
jurisprudence constante. Basically, these issues that have been decided, and
no tribunal would ever try to modify it. I will give you a couple of examples.
The question of whether federal agencies create responsibility for the state,
which is an easy public international law question. But in the investment
treaty arbitration, the question was posed, and it was answered. I think it
said a lot. Another one could be things such as whether minority
shareholders or minority investors could bring a claim. The question was
posed, and it has been settled. Nobody would think of bringing that question.
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I mean, they might, but they may not have learned anything in thirty years.
So, I think that all in all I would depart from the idea there is strong stare
decisis, and I would embrace the idea that on some topics there is this idea
of jurisprudence constante.
Now, on other issues, I think that your presentation was so good because
it ultimately encapsulated the idea of these cases which [are] controversial
because they involve public interest of the nation and, sometimes, of the
world. Think about the projects that are involved: sometimes, healthcare
issues are involved; sometimes, the environment is involved. So, that is why
it is so true that the states, and sometimes the states that are not party to the
controversy, may have a say. I could talk a little bit more, but I won’t. Thank
you.
P3: I do not know if P1 wanted to respond, or I could jump in. I will just
say I really thought your presentation was fascinating, and I am particularly
fascinated by this idea states having a say in the interpretation of treaties to
which they are party. So, just to be a little controversial along the lines of
M3, here, I would like to say, what if the treaty is gigantic? So, the ICSID
treaty, for example, has 158–159 parties or so. The New York Convention,
which is the other treaty by which international arbitration awards are
enforced, 150-some odd parties as well. So, if it is just a free trade agreement
between state A and state B, it is a little easier to say, “Okay, if there is a
claim against state B, let state A be in amicus.” But if it is a debate about the
meaning of the New York Convention, or an issue of the meeting of the
ICSID convention, can you have 150-some odd amici? Is there a limit? I do
not know. What would you say to that?
P1: I think I can tie together a couple of points here and addressing [sic]
both of your questions. The idea that I think states should be able to
participate in these investment arbitrations in order to help to find terms, in
particular, the protections that they have agreed to offer to investors under
the treaty. So, when, again, it is investor A suing state B, state A has an
interest in the outcome of how the treaty, and the protections in particular,
are interpreted. So, I think, as opposed [to] the New York Convention on
the enforcement and protection of awards or the ICSID convention, those
aren’t necessarily substantive protections that are being afforded to the
investor. Rather, they are either jurisdictional hurdles that an investor has to
overcome in order to gain access to arbitration or similar jurisdictional
hurdles for the enforcement of an award, usually interpreted by the courts. I
do not think that a state has as large of an interest in the interpretation of
those types of provisions, as, essentially, the protections that it has offered
already to afford to investors, but they are interpreted in a way that may be
expanded following the negotiation of the treaty. So, not by their own terms.
Not by the terms of how the state A and state B concluded this treaty, but by
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state B’s interpretation of the treaty and investor A’s interpretation of the
treaty.
Then, to address P2’s concern that stare decisis isn’t exactly germane in
investment arbitration— I totally agree. I would suggest that it is something
like stare decisis-like because, as these protections are interpreted over and
over again, there is consistency in the way that they are interpreted , but there
are slight differences if you look at fair and equitable treatment and the
inclusion of an investor’s legitimate expectations, for example. That has
been a contentious and controversial issue in a number of awards. Certainly,
as you say, it is a young system, and as more awards are rendered on these
issues, it is refined and whittled down to a point. But the point is that the
whittling down is happening by virtue of an investor’s interpretation and a
state’s interpretation, as opposed to a state-to-state agreement that was
entered into by the terms of those two states as opposed to a private entity.
P2: I think that we agree, and I would only add that the beauty of the
investment treaty arbitration system is that it gets that input from caselaw for
its development. At the same time, this is the other part, there is a treaty-
making power that also helps that development. It is kind of a symbiotic
relationship because the jurisprudence is there, and then the drafters read the
jurisprudence and sometimes adopt what has been there and qualified into
new treaties. There are examples of that. So, for instance, one example of
this is, for those of you that are aware of the use of the MFN to import
procedural provisions from one treaty into the applicable treaty or dispute
settlement provisions of one more favorable treaty into the applicable treaty.
That is a doctrine called the Maffezzini Doctrine after the case that created
it.13 After that was implemented in many, many, many cases, there was a
backlash, and the United States proposed in the old Free Trade Agreement
of the Americas in a little footnote. That agreement never came to life. The
United States proposed a little footnote in which that Maffezzini Doctrine
was prohibited, mainly. That in itself was adopted in many other treaties
throughout the world. Now, new treaties have a rejection to that doctrine.
So, ultimately there is this relationship between treaty-makers and cases,
which makes this all more fun.
M3: Questions from the audience?
A4: [audience question]
13. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objestions to Jurisdiction (Jan. 25. 2000); see Tribunale federale [TF] [Federal Tribunal]
June 29, 2017, 4A_600/2016 (Switz.); see also CAS Award in the Platini Case Upheld
by the Swiss Supreme Court, SWISS INT’L ARB. DECISIONS,
http://www.swissarbitrationdecisions.com/cas-award-platini-case-upheld-swiss-
supreme-court (last visited Aug. 28, 2019).
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P3: Absolutely. Great question, thank you raising that. So, here is
something to consider. If you look at the domestic court context, one of the
things that judges are very embarrassed [by] is when they get reversed. So,
if you can think about that in the arbitration context, similarly arbitrators do
not like for their awards to be overturned for whatever reason, whether it is
on the merits or otherwise. So, let’s say the arbitrator could have willful
ignorance about whether there is a funder, “I do not ask, I do not want to
know. Do not tell me whether there is a funder. I am going to decide the
case.” Then, later on, the losing party, and it usually is the loser, is unhappy
with the award for some reason and is looking for any possible reason to
challenge it. Whether it is a legitimate reason or not, they are just looking
for some reason to challenge the award. They find out that there was a
funder; they find out that the arbitrator didn’t disclose some connection to
that funder because the arbitrator didn’t know about. They intentionally tried
not to know about it, but they can still use that to challenge the award. The
arbitrator wouldn’t be able to argue, “Well, I didn’t know. That is why I was
not affected.” That would not be an argument that would stand up in court.
It would be an assumption made that by not disclosing this connection, or at
least not asking about it, there must be some malicious intent on the part of
the arbitrator to hide it. That would be the way the court would view it, and,
therefore, the award would be potentially set aside, vacated, or whatever the
court decides to do with it.
To avoid that on the back end because the parties have spent time, money,
energy, frustration, all this to get through this arbitration, and to have an
award, and then it be overturned, is frustrating for everybody. So, to avoid
all of that, it is better for arbitrators to ask the question at the front end, get
an answer, and then there is the key, they can disclose, “Actually, you’re
being funded by funder A. Well, five years ago I was at the council in a case
funded by funder A.” Disclose that to the parties. Often the parties will
waive a conflict if it has specific parameters with respect to time and there is
repetition, and also to things that you would have to look at. But the parties
can say, “That is okay. We will let you still serve as our arbitrator. Thank
you for disclosing that.” Therefore, you then neutralize the possibility of the
award being challenged on the back end. So, that is the reason.
P2: Just to supplement that. When I was still counsel to parties, I have
been before tribunals, whereas counsel for the state, we didn’t even raise any
question as to the identity of the third-party funder. We didn’t even ask the
tribunal for anything. The minute the tribunal learned that there was third-
party funding, they wanted to know who it was because the most valuable
asset that an arbitrator has, it is his or her reputation. They want to know
whether she or her law firm ever had a relationship with a funder to make
sure that they have no conflict of interest. So, it is obvious that they want to
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know.
I want to answer one question from M3, which is, “Why should this
exist?” I mean, is it legitimate that third-party funding exists? The other
question that you had is, “The numbers are not right. If there is party
funding, there is going to be more cases overall.” I agree with that.
Mathematically, that is true, but not with the premise that there will be more
frivolous cases. So, where does that [take] us? That takes us to the first
question. That takes us to — why is it legitimate to have it? Think about
claimants that will not be able to bring their cases except for there being a
funder. So, ultimately, it is related to an issue of access to justice. Is the
issue [of] access to justice related to a profit? Yes, it is. Is the legal practice
for profit? Yes, it is. So, the idea that you can actually do good for profit is
not irrational and is not based on “la la land.” Ultimately, the basis is more
access to justice — yes, for profit in some cases — and having all the actors
follow a set of ethical and substantial controls, so that it can happen.
P3: May I be a little controversial? I will push back on that a little bit.
So, yes, the legal industry is for profit and yes, we have allowed contingency
fees — we allow attorneys to invest in their own cases. But we also have
robust codes of ethics and conduct that are enforced by the bar with teeth:
you can be disbarred; you can be suspended. You can be publicly
reprimanded as an attorney if you engage in some practice that violates the
rules regarding contingent fees. Pretty much every jurisdiction has some cap
on contingent fees and things like that. So, we allow it, but we have all of
these restrictions and rules. The third-party funding industry is not, at this
point in time, governed by a similar set of rules, guidelines, and
consequences. I am pushing back on that.
P2: No, that is a great question. Thank you, P3. I thought that we were
not going to be able to disagree on something, but I am glad that we are.
M3: On that note, let me say that Karl Llewellyn, one of the great law
professors of all time, said, “The job of the law professor is to stir up the
students.” So, if we’ve achieved our goal, you go out and come to blows
over third-party funding of arbitration over dessert and coffee outside. I
think there are some concluding remarks.
